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Art Education in an Age ofTeletechnology:
On the Impossibility of Portraiture
jan jagodzinski
The preText: Lacanian Moves of the Real

Art since the Renaissance has been obsessed with the portrait
and defined by it as the form of representation made even more
iconic through the invention of photography where the notion of
the profile became established as a sign of prosperity, prestige and
power (Sekula, 1986). This enlightenment tradition of portraiture
is not likely to perish at any given future date; the digitalization of
the image continues to make the banal snap-shot proliferate at such
an incredible rate identifYing the thirst for personal representation
in contemporary society. The explosion of celebrity magazines, the
spread of the paparazzi, and the easy access to digital printers should
give us all the more reason why art educators s,hould re-examine the
representational value of portraiture as subject matter for the art
classroom.
Artists and art educators have always included portraiture as part
of their curriculum repertoire. It has a long venerable tradition in art
education since the founding of the Florentine Academy during the
Renaissance where anatomy and life drawing were first taught. The
growth of portraiture, of course, reaches its height in Holland with
such figures as Franz Hals, Rembrandt and Vermeer, where humanism
takes command, so to speak, as the haute bourgeoisie are able to gain
economic ground, setting up the first Constitution in 1588 against
the interests of Church and Aristocracy.. The portrait essentially was
a representational technology that "stole" the light of God from the
Church and 'power from the Aristocracy by imbuing the sitter with
a "unique" subjectivity and importance, as if two subjectivities were
present: the actual representation of the sitter and his or her "unique"
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self perceived as the "soul" of the person, an ideal inner self that
is aligned with God. Vermeer's studio was essentially an inverted
Cathedral. Hence, the artist was always judged as to whether he (it
was a male dominated occupation) could capture the "essence" of the
person through the skill of the hand. The technology of representation:
the under-painting in grays, the grinding of colored minerals, and
the glazing techniques with oil paint secularizes "revealed theology"
as "natural theology" by presenting the tangibility of things.
This "double" claim of portraiture held up even stronger when
the bourgeoisie came to power, establishing Nations through
revolutionary means. The Impressionists readily represented the
bourgeoisie frolicking along the banks of the Seine through a
technology that ranged from rapid (Degas, Monet) to slow (Seurat)
brush strokes, with watercolors, paintings and sketches done en plein
air rather than necessarily confined to the studio, as empiricism

reigned supreme. Again, the skill of rendering the portrait, still a
fascination for tourists who watch sidewalk artists earning their
keep, was retained. However, the move towards artifice, as in the
developments of post-Impressionism, already meant a confrontation
with photography that had begun in 1839 with Daguerre when
photographic technologies eventually put into question the
"essential" self as it became increasingly easier to touch up the
negatives to produce ideal images, a direction which has now lead us
to the complete manipulation of the digitalized image.
Since the invention of photography, it is often argued that
technology of the lens apparatus and printing process changes our
understanding of what portraiture "is." In a seminal essay, the art
historian and theorist Rosalind Krauss (1985) argued that "[e]very
photograph is the result of a physical imprint transferred by light
reflections onto a ;ensitive su"rface. The photograph is thus a type
of icon, or visual likeness, which bears an indexical relationship to
its object" (p.203). She goes on to suggest in the second part of her
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essay that:
the effect of the work is that its relation to its subject is that of
the index, the impression, the trace. The painting is thus a sign
connected to a referent along a purely physical axis. And this
indexical quality is precisely the one of photography. (p.215)
published in 1977, Krauss could not have anticipated that by the turn
of the century the day of chemical-based technologies would be over
(except for "purists" who complement those enthusiasts of vintage
"vinyl" music and analogue synthesizers). "Technically" speaking,
however, Krauss is entirely right despite this technological change.
The conventional icon/index that defined duality in photography
has broken down. But, of course, the iconic portrait continues to
function in everyday life, otherwise the industrial complex that
surrounds the reproduction of "family snaps" would collapse-not
likely to happen given the thirst for "memories" that attempt to
freeze time as reminders of how we thought we once "were."
The family "snap" at first glance, seems to preserve the claim that,
like the former technologies of painting, the "essence" of the person
photographed is being "caught." The paparazzi photo functions in
this way as well: the celebrity is "caught" in his or her "natural" state
of just being "human." Often, this means being caught unaware,
undressed or in some unflattering pose, just the opposite of the
artifice or role as a celebrity's mask. Somehow, this is perceived as
being the "authentic" self In this way the paparazzi "steal" a celebrity's
jouissance (libidinal vitality) so it can be consumed by a voyeuristic
public-a rather vampirish act. However, the photographic archive
that each family or individual member possesses, oddly enough, has
little do with representation per se. What is this "essence" that seems
to fade in an age of simulacra? The photographic archive seems to
point to its "outside," to what cannot be retrieved, to what cannot be
represented-to the impossibility of time itself It is this impossible
"trace" that Marianne Hirsch (1997) is able to articulate so well in
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her Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postm em 0 ry. As she
notes in her opening discussion of Roland Barthes celebrated study
on photography, Camera Lucida (1981), the one photograph that he
cherishes and discusses in detail, where he finds not only his mother
but the qualities of their relationship -a congruence between "my
mother's being and my grief at her death" (p.70)-is not reproduced

in his book. For us, as viewers, it would just be another generic family
photograph from a long time ago. We cannot see the photograph like
he sees it. It is impossible. Yet, this picture of his mother provoked in
him a moment of self-recognition. In his reading process, it opened
up a corridor of time enabling a process of self-discovery, a discovery
of a self-in-relation to his mother-as his loss and his mourning.
The photograph "moved" him as it released its frozen moment of
time down a corridor that seems faster than the speed of light. The
referent (his mother) haunts him like a ghost, evoking what has now
become the mainstay of our understanding of what he meant by the
sting, prick, cut or puncture of the punctum of the photograph. So,
while there is no doubt that technology changes the way we "see"
the world through an "inhuman" eye made possible by the machinic
lenses of the cinematic apparatus, the fundamental question of the
"impossibility" of representation remains open to question.
The first part of this essay draws a preText. It draws on
psychoanalytic theory of Lacan to question the very "possibility" of
portraiture and to rethink its practice along non-representational
lines; that is, as a practice of "impossibility" where the failure of
representation is already presupposed. The second part, which I call
the text, extends this discussion to Deleuze and his notions of the
time-image to further the question of grappling with an art practice
that ruins representation.
What Barthes' Camera Lucida teaches us (from the spectator side
in this case) is that the object must "look" back at us if we are to
meet its gaze. It looks back at us not from its immediate physical

--
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location-after all, Barthes came across this particular photograph
amongst many. But only this one made him hesitate. It shocked him
immediately. Contemplation occurred only after this initial "punch"
took place. Rather, the photograph looked back at him from a site
that cannot be articulated through the cite of language, nor can it be
seen (sighted). We have to posit a bodily register that exceeds both
language and representation. For Lacan this is the psychic register
of the Real, the unconscious, and if we were to give this claim a
Deleuzean twist, we can call it the brain, a site that can never know
itself, that can never be entirely transparent to itself, no matter what
the context is. Some aspect of the brain's functioning will always
remain mysterious and unknown no matter how sophisticated
neuroscience might become. And, so it is with the unconscious.
There is a negativity that pervades all of life-an unknown dimension
that remains opaque.
We can now add to this yet another aspect-the virtuality
of time as a past that always presses on the present, on the actual
"now." Such a time dimension-in the form of memories, traumas,
dreams, hallucinations, and above all desire, haunts the register of
the Real and the affected body. From a Lacanian psychoanalytic
perspective, when the object "looks" back desire has been created in
the register of fantasy and impossibility. It was, after all, Barthes loss
of his mother that prompted his hesitation. Simply put, the object
of desire is caught up in an unfulfillable (impossible) search for an
eternally "lost" pleasure-a pleasure referred to as jouissance-when,
as infants, we become civilized as our bodies become "shaped" by
cultural discourses and image formations as we slowly enculturate
to become law biding citizens. Psychoanalytically speaking, aphanisis
or a fading of the full possibility of the polymorphous sexual subject
takes place as the infant realizes that the Other (parents and society
at large) demands and expects certain behaviors of him or her that
have to be followed. The infant can no longer expect to get every
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little thing s/he wants. Some pleasure has to be given up-it becomes
lost in this sense, retrievable only through imaginary fantasy. In a

phallogocentric society such as ours, to become a speaking subject
this means the infant must take up either a masculine or feminine
position usually along biological lines. One must (mistakenly) assume
that one has the phallus (active) as the abstract symbol of power, or
one must assume that one is (passive) the phallus. This latter position
associated with the feminine position, stands in for what masculinity
desires to feel complete. For Barthes, an openly outed gay who strove
not to be so positioned by the symbolic order, the desire to recall his
mother to help restore this lost jouissance was therefore especially
acute.

Exploring the Psychic Real
Let us now look on the painter's side of things rather than
that of the spectator, to flesh out the claims when explo~ing the
intricacies between desire, jouissance, memory, time, and the psychic
register of the Real. In her magnificent study of Rembrandt, whose
prolific output of self-portraits constitutes and exemplifies the
artist striving to assert self-reflective individuality so that he might
improve his status as a miller's son in seventeenth century Holland,
a country where both Church and Royalty had been displaced by
an early constitutional government formulated by a moneyed haute
bourgeoisie, Mieke Bal (1991) writes:
The self-portrait can become self-reflexive, not because it shows
us the face we know to belong to the painter, but because
it stands for the study-for the practice of painting and its
difficulties ... [T]he self-portrait gains in self-reflexivity when
the reflection on painting is not signified in the study, in the
exaltation of the self but in the detail that demonstrates the
danger to the self .. .. The body at risk is the representation of the
threat to subjective wholeness that self-reflection poses. (pp.

--
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254-255, added emphasis)
Bal fingers something like Barthes' punctum, but now placed on the
artist's side. Of the hundreds (should we say thousands?) of portraits
(paintings and sketches) that Rembrandt did, several stand out that
mark the trace of this bodily "risk" she identifies. Despite his wealth,
Rembrandt's life of ostentatious living led to bankruptcy and his life
was filled with great personal tragedy (only one of his four children
survived birth and his wife died at the young age of 30). Despite
this, his artistic output increased, which seems contradictory. Yet,
it is through artistic work that an artist's symptom separates itself
from jouissance. The symptoms of Rembrandt's suffering brought on
by the loss of his three children, wife and fortune, fueled his desire
as he fell into subjective destitution. "[T]he symptom is jouissance
as sense enjoyed by a subject, while a piece of [art] work offers a
sense to be enjoyed by whoever wants to enjoy it ... the condition of
creation is that the subject realizes that the Other does not exist" (p.
43), by which Miller (1998), Lacan's brother-in-law and the author
of this sentence, means that through art the suffering associated
with jouissance is sublimated. "The Other does not exist" refers to a
pushing back of the expectations of the symbolic order that position
and mortify the body in a particular way. There is a certain freeing
of the self by facing the very void that is the empty center of the
self, formed by the evacuation or loss of polymorphous sexuality-of

jouissance. Only when Rembrandt dared to face this abyss within
himself, brought on by the utter devastation of his psyche through
those losses-his children, his wife and then his fortune, was he most
successful in capturing that "danger to the self" which Bal writes
about. Portraiture no longer is just simply a question of representing
"subjective wholeness." The representation of such "wholeness" is
precisely what Lacan meant by his notion that the ego misrecognizes
(meconniassance) itselF: It is when artists paint or snap portraits
representationally that they avoid the "work" of being an artist. This
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"work," as I will come to show at the end of this essay, refers to
the struggle with non-representation, with the attempt to open up
realms of the unthought. So, for instance, Rembrandt's reworking
of the Bible along more secular grounds is yet another indicator of
his struggle with this "big" Other as represented by the power ?f
the Church. His secularization of biblical themes raised questions
concerning official interpretations. Some have argued (Hayes, 1999)
that the self-portraits of Bernini, Rembrandt's contemporary, equally
exhibit gazes that are always querulous and indecisive-no longer
self assured and confident autonomous subjects was the case in their
predecessors: Alberti, Botticelli, Leonardo, Michelangelo.
Let me develop a more, perhaps obvious example in the welltrodden iconography of Modernism that every art teacher knows,
but now can be read with a twist of Deleuzean-Lacanian theorythe "expressionist" artistic output of Edvard Munch, the same
Munch who could not part (easily) with his portraits, who worked
continuously on some canvases for more than ten years, still feeling
dissatisfied that the image was finished. Slavoj Zizek (1991) has done
an excellent expose of how Munch's work embodies the Real, but it
is Lacan in Seminar XII (I964-65) , known as "Crucial Problems
for Psychoanalysis" who took the time to analyze in Seminar 12:
Wednesday 17, March 1965, Munch's celebrated self-portrait The

Scream. What Lacan demonstrates is usually the very opposite of
what "seems" representationally to be the case by this 'portrait' of
Munch in a state of incomprehensible psychic turmoil. It is the
scream that brings on silence and not the other way around says
Lacan. The scream he says, "abolishes itself in silence . . . The scream
is traversed by the space of the silence without dwelling in it; they are
not linked either by being together or succeeding one another, the
scream creates the abyss into which silence rushes." This has "already
happened," he says, "when we see Munch's image." In other words,
the silence of the scream pierces us right away. Its frozen moment of

-
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time is instantaneously released. What remains "stuck in Munch's
throat," the signification that he is unable to speak, that turns his
larynx into a pipe, exposing the inherent point of failure (the very
limit) of subjectivity, is the very ontological gap of Being itself-the
gaping abyss that forms his mouth in the painting. This, properly
speaking, is the "work" of portraiture. The subject is the subject of
representation-of the signifier-precisely because of the status of
this fundamental void of impossibility, the kernel of the Real that lies
at the heart of subjectivity itself. This impossible void, nevertheless,
enables the very )condition of possibility for infinitude of possible
significations to emerge. As Lacan and Zizek, his best contemporary
translator show, Munch's Scream makes accessible the impact of
traumatic experience where we (in Hegelian terms) experience a
"night of the world"-the "true" condition of the subject where the
lived coherence and cohesion of the ego in control of reality becomes
ruptured. The point is that this rupture happens more often than
we think if we stay tuned to it and "work" through it. This is not
"therapy" in the traditional sense, but recognition that the work of
art sublimates the Real, and that there is a certain ethics to both
viewing and doing such work. In the Freudian tradition working
through one's aggression, anxiety, angry, envy and so on, creatively,
provide a distance from these uncontrollable emotional responses.
Hence, the "ethics of the Real" that is involved requires sensitivity
to the way we approach such a volatile and potentially destructive
state of being.
Text: Deleuzean Moves of the Time-Image
The enigma of such portraiture, like that of the Mona Lisa's
smile, rests in this time dimension of the Real. It is this dimension of
virtual time, a Deleuzean development, and the psychic register of the
Real, a Lacanian development, which can help art educators rethink
portraiture in an age of teletechnology where the mediated world of
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lens technology and the ubiquity of the image seems to promote an
overlooking of time as memory and the unconscious desire of the
Real. This is what the next section attempts to do: provide an insight
to such a possibility.

In an age of the image society where teletechnological media

attempt to construct our societal consciousness, this part of the essay
attempts to help rethink representation's "outside" by drawing now
on the work of Giles Deleuze to further Lacan by focusing on the
"portraiture" of Francis Bacon and the "living" monumentalism of
Jochen Gertz. This move might help us grasp the necessity of ruining
representation by introducing a much-needed re-conceptualization
of time and sensation that remains wedded to objects and their
movements through narration, illustration, and representation.
The attempt in this part of the essay is to grasp thinking of an art
education that no longer goes from image to thought, that is from

percept to concept-such a direction is overwhelming present in
elementary art education where story telling narratives through
images is perhaps the quintessential practice in all its possible myriad
of forms-nor from concept to affect; that is from thought to image,
which is the polar opposite practice that governs much of junior
and high school art where self-expressionism still by and large reigns
supreme and supported by various forms of arts based research
where the researcher's subjectivity still remains a central concern.
Exceptions to this set of generalities can dlways be found-but this
legacy of modernism continues to linger in our schools despite the
rhetoric that there are inroads being made towards teaching more
contemporary art forms like performance art, installation, and
conceptualism-all three of which, provide a way to surpass the above
stated bifurcated dialectic.
Performance art, installation and conceptual art are three forms
that begin to deconstruct representation a~ such. In these forms, time
has been pulled away from an action-image dominated by movement

-
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(gesture) and explored as an entity in itself, and not attached to an
object as famously developed in the early modernism by cubists and
futurists. Performance art gives us time taken away from movement,
often disembodying the voice and repeating movement through
various forms of automation; conceptual art gives us thought
immanent to the image, while installation art gives us conceptual
time-space in which the body must relate to in new ways. In all three
art forms, the event as a problematic comes to us from the "outside"
- not in our comprehension or control.
To go beyond this stated bifurcation, we take the Deleuzean
path where concept and image are one. As Deleuze (1989) puts it,
"The concept is in itself in the image, and the image is for itself
the concept. This is no longer organic and pathetic but dramatic,
pragmatic, praxis, or action thought" (p. 161). To state this proposed
trajectory as succinctly and forcefully as possible, an art education that
is "fit" for contemporary society must move away from its emphasis
on the "still" image and the action narrative, even that of journalistic
photography where time is still governed by movement and space,
and begin to identify the way time itself, in the current forms of the
moving image of the new media, is being explored through "new
lines of flight" that encompass virtual forms of presentation. This
is where Nietzschean necessity of entertaining the "powers of the
false," a positive sense oflying (see Deleuze, 1989, chapter 5) becomes
important since we no longer live in a society where fact and fiction
can be distinguished from one another. Simulacra and the decentering
of the faith and belief in the documentary (especially the factual
claims of news) as just another form of construction necessitates
that art educators rethink our teaching positions, which generally
remain fixated by the "-isms" of modernism because they are easily
categorized and can be taught as distinct movements, and especially
because they appeal to the school curricula structures with their wellordered buzzer blocked times of so many minutes. A different order
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of understanding of the body, offered by some forms of time-cinema,
installation art and performance, provide a change in perception that
identifies a body of dispersed sensations that is being technologized
and targeted as separate organs. The tension between the cyborgian
body of technology and what William Gibson and sci-fi fans call
"meat" is part of this identifiable gap-the gap between living "flesh"
and dead "meat" which refuses to become entirely absorbed into the
machine.
From a Deleuzian perspective a very different notion of the
subject emerges, a subject not so much in control of its environment
as an agent, but · also not a subject who is entirely controlled by
the institutional agencies (Le., by Foucault's understanding of
governmentalities). His is not a body in the usual phenomenological
sense as theorized by Husserl and then entertained by a long line
of aestheticians starting from Merleau-Ponty and Mikel Dufrenne,
but a body "before discourse, before words, before the naming
of things" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 38), which reiterates a
similar distinction Lyotard (1971) makes between the figure and the
figural.
This view disrupts the usual seamless narratological arts based
research and self-expressionistic works that are the order of the day.
In this view, the image is unhinged from the body as well as reality.
The subject to the body is reversed where the synthetic apperception
I

of I-Me-present-to-itself becomes undone. Especially with cinema
"the image no longer derives from perceiving (sleeping, memorizing
... ) body, nor from a rain-archive of data; the image sets the subject
adrift, sucking it into a trans perceptive and ' falsifying world.'
Thought becomes immanent to the image (Deleuze, 1989, p. 173).
"Depth of field is no longer understood in relation to obstacles and
the concealment of things ... as in Euclidian perspective.: .. but in
relation to a light which makes us see beings and objects according to
their opacity" (Deleuze 1989, p. 176). Thought becomes immanent
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to the image. And, of course, this is one of the foundational ideas of
conceptual art. We can apply this to the three art forms mentioned
earlier. With installation art, the viewer is forced to piece a disjointed
narrative together by him or herself, as the installation holds
the "secret" of what is trying to be "shown" by not revealing nor
reveling in its obviousness. Performance, which is just the opposite
of conceptual art, attempts to introduce the body "Real" into
movement by staging its event in such a way that its perception by
spectators is duly "hesitated," in the sense of time as duree, forcing
estrangement and thus reflexion. Finally, with Conceptual Art, the
force is to recognize art as an Idea where an anti-aesthetic approach
requires that the witness (or artist) explicate to him or herself what
the work is about. Time here is "hesitated" as well since, with some
conceptual pieces, the viewer may never "get" it. The anti-narrative
may never emerge.
Although these remarks may appear enigmatic because of the
complexity of the contemporary shifts by artists to grasp antihumanist notions of the self, I will begin by discussing one work
of Francis Bacon as an artist who stood on the threshold between
movement image and the time-image ... still working with a "still"
image but making it move, and one work by the Jochen Gertz, a
conceptual artist whose "work" does away with representation,
certainly not meant as a mere drift into abstraction or its variants.
These two arts should help to articulate these somewhat troublesome
theoretical musings.

Francis Bacon: Nowhere Space and Time (Non-Euclidian Space)
Bacon can be considered as the exemplary portrait artist in
terms of emphasizing the psychic register of the Real as theorized by
Lacan and exemplifying the time-image as contemplated by Deleuze.
Deleuze (2004) has written a very important book exemplifying
Bacon's attempt to explore the body of the "flesh," that is, the body of
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sensation, what Deleuze and Guattari (1983) named (after Antonin
Artaud) the "body without organs" (BwO). Sensation is no longer
thought representationally-as the sense of stirring the emotions
of the viewer-but in the sense of the consciousness of perceiving
itself This is not phenomenological for there is no "intent" by the

consciousness for an object, which would plunge us back again into
representation. While much can be said about Bacon, the approach
here is to discuss his theory of affective embodiment by examining
just one of his many works: Triptych May-June 1973. Since copyright
laws are always problematic there is an excellent Bacon online site
(http://www.francis-bacon.cx/) that lists his works chronologically. I
encourage the reader to look up this particular work before reading
ahead.
The first thing to note about Bacon is that many of his
painting are composed as triptYchs, which seem to lend themselves
immediately to narrative representation. It is precisely such narrative
representation of the movement image that is being deconstructed
and the time of the gaps existing in the Real between the three frames
that are being engaged, implicating the viewer to "figure" it out this
"other" space-time dimension. Sometimes two or more characters
(figures) are placed in the same space, which suggests an interaction
between them as if they are caught in the middle of an act, even
when this act seems stilled (sleeping, sitting, lying around, waiting).
Time is introduced into his paintings through a "rough" style of
paint application to the figures (especially the heads and bodies).
Heads and bodies appear to be in constant motion, as if the body is
constantly flowing and shifting. This movement, however, is nonnarratological. Something always "seems" to be going on, but the
viewer is unable to piece together some coherent story between the
three frames. Further, the figures are often enclosed in a translucent
surround by means of circles, parallelepipeds, or frames within the
canvas-as if there is a proximal distance between inside and outside
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of the body that is constantly being imperceptibly exchanged.

Triptych May-June 1973 shows a single subject performing a
sequence of actions in a bathroom. Two doorways on opposite walls
frame the figure. In western perception, text is read left to right.

It appears at first glance that Bacon attempts often to consciously
reverse this taken-for-granted perception by forcing the viewer to
read right to left. The right panel depicts a naked man vomiting
into a bathroom sink. He then crosses the room (middle panel) and
sits on a toilet (left panel), as if he is dead or keeled over. His face
is buried in his hands. Hands and face form one big mass. Such
would be a "normative" reading of the work. On closer inspection
however, such a reading is put into serious doubt. When one focuses
on the details another more striking problematic emerges. The light
switch on the left panel is repeated on the right panel, but is has now
"moved" to the other door! The doorjamb that frames the figure is
depicted frontally in the center panel but the angle of the doorjambs
on the left panel is painted from a slight movement to the right
showing a bit of the left door, while in the right panel the doorjambs
have been painted from a slightly left perspective showing slightly
the perspective of the right door. So the left and right panel seems to
be mirror opposites. The viewer now cannot read the narrative from
right to left nor left to right, but is positioned on the center panel.
Bacon is not illustrating an action sequence, a movement image.
He is conceptualizing something more profound by the implication
of time that is being introduced. A light bulb appea'rs in the central
panel, which is obviously missing in the left and right panels. The lightswitch is also absent in the central panel. In this new subject position,
the viewer must begin to read these panels as to their symmetry or
comparability. On both the left and right panels the body is clearly
in pain-excreting abject bodily fluids: shit and vomit. As reversals
these panels present us with two holes-the asshole and the mouth
hole; the ass-mouth connection form a "desiring machine" in Deleuze
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and Guattari's (1983) terms. The central panel adds to the clue.
What is striking in this panel is the shadow that is coming out of the
doorway. Clearly, this is not a "naturalistic" shadow, a representation
of the figure, but "the night of the world" to use Hegel's phrase again.

It is amorphous, having vampire-bat like qualities-what Deleuze
and Guattari would name as "becoming-animal." As a body fluid,
this shadow seems more viscose-thicker and more substantial than
the figure who seems rather insubstantial. As if the shadow that flows
from his body is more overwhelming, draining him so that he only
appears as a corpse, making him the ghost of the shadow, reversing
the usual understanding of shadow and its object. Something in the
body is afflicting the subject. The body Real-the suffering of physic
pain is being juxtaposed to its externalization as abjected bodily
fluids made possible through the ass-mouth assemblage machine.
The physical excesses of the body are compared to the shadow-Thing
that is overwhelming him. Hence, there is a similarity between all
three events, held in the way Bacon has presented us with the body
of sensation through representation that has reversed substantiality
and its void, the kernel of our unconscious Real.

Jochen Gertz: The Disappearance of the Object
Jochen Gertz is an artist, but an artist who does not draw, paint
or sculpt! Further, he does not create objects in the usual sense of the
term, nor is there anything to "see" in the usual way art education
has treated sight. He might be called a portrait artist since the "work"
of his art grapples with memory, namely monuments as "time that
is out of joint." The idea of a monument is perhaps the apotheosis
of what it means to remain in the realm of representation. The
traditional purposes of a monument is to function like a stele, a
beacon, to etch the memory into the most permanent and durable
of materials-marble, stone, steel, bronze. Monuments are meant to
center a community to a memory. All such commemoration leads to,

-
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more or less, religious communion. It endorses an official memory to
perpetuate a past recollection. Monuments act like banks-time and
memory are locked into a social space like a vault, trapped as it were,
into a permanent reminder.
Gertz is interested in the "other" of such memorializing, to
awaken the forgetting that haunts every memorial of its permanency
as it rusts, decays or is simply forgotten. His invisible monuments
have a peculiar force to exhibiting what you are not supposed to
see-the haunt of the Real. They make the spectator "see" what
cannot be seen. They make the "visible" arise where it is lacking-to
exhibit the time of absence of bodies and the memory gaps that are
kept out of the perceptual space of representation. Their character is
not "to say," but to assert what cannot be said, the absent in the field
of the visible. Like The Scream, these monuments plant a "bone in
the throat," so that their silence pierces that which is not being heard
nor recollected. It forces the spectator to become a witness to that
which is anamorphic to the monument itself Gertz's works initiate
a transfer of memory into the viewer's living memory, conveying the
dead recollections of the monuments that usually mortify memory.
Gertz by doing the "proper" work of art, once again releases time.
Although there are many examples in his oeuvre that continually
demonstrate this uncanniness, let me take one: The Anti-Fascist
Memorial in Hamburg (Das Hamburger Mahnmal gegen Faschismus) ,
collaborated with his wife Esther Shavlev, and unveiled in Oct. 1986.
(Again, I encourage the reader to google him- http://de.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Jochen_Gerz). The monument is a square column-40 feet
high by three feet on each of its 4 sides. It was entirely wrapped
with sheets of black lead. A sign in eight different languages was
fixed to a nearby wall where spectators could read and then leave
their signatures and thoughts on the omonument by carving in the
lead with the help of stilettos provided. (Some blasted the column
with their shotguns, leaving their pellet marks of hate!) This phallic
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column was meant to sink into the ground about six feet per year
enabling inscribers to access its very peak. By Nov. 1993, five years
later, it had completely vanished into the ground, becoming invisible.
Only its flat top appeared at street level as a pavement stone covered
by a glass plate as if to say that this is Germany's foundation. The sign
for the instructions had appropriately ended with: "Since nothing
can stand up for us against injustice." Gertz's conceptual monument
changed its identity with the time of its movement to the point of its
de-erection. No longer a souvenir, it became a memorial to the holes
in memory, a memorial to oblivion, loss, absence and to the actual
facts - all aspects of the Real. His "work" addresses the problem of
representation by creating a screen to the effects of the Real. It is a
non-specular resemblance, meta-mimetic in the way representation
is erased through the time of its disappearance.

The "Work" of Art
The notion of "work" has emerged "time and time" again
throughout this essay to suggest that the "work" of self-portraiture
tackles the void of the Self in the register of the Real. This is the
place of "becoming," as the consciousness of perceiving itself. This
is where the difficulty of art lies, the difficulty that emerges when
working in a world of the aestheticized image that surrounds us
through the screen images of telematic technologies. Representation
is not life. Representation cannot preserve life. It can only expose
its undoing, not as the essence of life, but as death. Death, like the
inevitable butterfly that is chloroformed and pinned in order to be
studied through the microscope. If life is not to be shown to be just
represent~tion,

as so many structuralist theories tend to do, then the
dimension of virtual time in the psychic register of the Real has to
be engaged in as in the "works" of artists like Gertz, Munch, Bacon.
They reveal a dimension of becoming that forms the gaps of the
seamless narrative we tell ourselves, the narrative of representation
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that forgets the unthought-the "work" of creativity.
This to suggest that art education much engage the affective body
(BwO) at the level, paradoxically that is "beyond" representation,
not a easy task in a designer capitalist world where it is the business
of the neo-capitalist enterprise to reproduce an aestheticized world of
consumerable images. I recall seeing Alfredo Jaar's installation called

Geography = W'llr, 1990, I believe it was at the Venice Biennale but I am
not sure, where the "secret" of the work was revealed to me only after
I entered the darkened room and tried to figure out just what was
being shown-it was like a rebus puzzle. The installation consisted of
a series of photograph-bearing light boxes that hung over six waterfilled oil drums tightly packed together 3X3, the photos reflecting on
the surface. I could blow on the water and make each one quiver, and
also see my silhouette as a reflection when I peered over to look at the
photos. One of the images that quivered in the water showed several
people in hazmat suits investigating what looked like a dumpsite.
Another image that reflected on the floating pool was a man holding
his hands to his face. I soon realized that this was about corporate
exploitation and expropriation not only of Nigeria's natural exports,
such as oil, but also the use of Nigeria as a dumpling ground for
toxic industrial waste by US and Europe. Jaar's light boxes reverse
the usual advertised goods by projecting Nigerian people suffering
from this capitalist exploitation, and we the viewers are potentially
implicated, symbolically shown when we stare into the barrel to see
the sights of devastation.
This essay points to the task at hand if a political and ethical
engagement of the world by our art students is to be maintained, but
does not offer some sort of definitive curriculum. It suggests a change
to installation, performance, time-based imagery, and conceptual
art, which offers the possibility of such a direction. I believe these
arts offer the power of a self-refleXion, where the core of the self
as BwO is disturbed as an affective neurological level as marked by
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the "X." In the past, the field of art education has tended to follow
(albeit belatedly) the trends of contemporary art-theoretically and
stylistically. There are no guarantees that the field of education, which
is continually seduced by representational images, will engage such a
possibility. Is it even possible in overcrowded schools that are perhaps
structured to prevent such awareness? "Time" will tell. 1
1

I would like to thank Olivia Gude for her suggestions when rewriting this essay.
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